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Abstract
This paper reviews a recent paper by De Loecker and Warzynski (AER, 2012), which developed
a method (so-called DLW method) to estimate markups (market powers) using plant-level pro-
duction data. Although DLW aimed to explore the relationship between markups and export
behavior, its core value is the estimation method of firm-level markups. However, this paper finds
that the DLW method still has some errors, one is the disadvantages of supply-side model, the
other is that they used an identical equation to estimate markup.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Market power (or markup) is an old topic in the fields of industrial organization and international
trade; many prestigious economists have researched it, such as Chamberlin (1933), Lerner (1934,
1972), Samuelson (1964), Bresnahan (1989), and Tirole (2015). With the rapid development of
empirical methods, this problem has been studied in more depth (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes, 1995), but to date, there is still no authoritative method to measure market power (or
markup) and accompanying welfare loss.
A recent paper by De Loecker and Warzynski (AER, 2012), henceforth DLW, develops a
method to estimate markups using plant-level production data. The paper has been cited by a lot
of scholars, because the method (so-called DLW method) is relatively easy to operate. Although
this paper aims to explore the relationship between markups and export behavior, its core value
is the estimation method of firm-level markups. However, we find that the DLW method still has
some errors. Because cannot obtain the primitive data, we just give a theoretical explanation.
2 MEARURING METHODS OF MARKUP
There are two types of models to estimate markup: One is the supply-side model, and the other is
the demand-side model. The former is more convenient (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012; Berry
and Haile, 2015), but the latter is more popular in academia (for example, Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2000, 2001). Of course, as shown in Table 1, each method has advantages and
disadvantages. For example, estimation of the demand-side model is relatively difficult, especially
when facing serious endogenous problems1, but its premise conditions are more tolerant.
Relies on the first order condition (FOC) of cost minimization, DLW gave the expression of
1The endogenous problem is caused by the interaction of price and market share (demand).
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Supply-side methods Demand-side methods
Markup markup = P/MC markup = P −MC
Literature Hall (1988); Roeger (1995); Klette Berry (1994); BLP (1995); Goldberg (1995);
(1999); Ellis and Halvorsen (2002); Nevo (2000, 2001); Capps et al. (2003);
DeSouza (2009); De Loecker (2011); Davis (2006); Zhelobodko et al. (2012);
De Loecker and Warzynshi (2012) Berry and Haile (2015); Pakes (2015)
Advantages (1) Less micro data requirements. (1) Do not require that every plant has
(2) Do not consider endogenous and realized cost optimization.
instrumental variables. (2) Can estimate demand system, is
(3) Do not consider product convenient to analyze price competition.
characteristics. (3) Can estimate some other parameters in
(4) Be easy to calculate. addition to markup.
Disadvantages (1) Assume at least one input factors (1) Endogeneity and instrumental variables
are free to adjust. selection.
(2) Assume that every plant has (2) Need abundant product-level micro data,
realized cost optimization. and long-panel data structure.
(3) Assume a special production (3) Assume a special utility function, and
function. simulate the market share.
(4) Need to control TFP.
Note: P defines price, MC defines marginal cost. In order to remain consistent with DLW, this paper uses the
division-form markup (P/MC), which can also be derived straightforwardly from Lerner index and has no unit.
Source: Summarized by the authors.
Table 1: Supply-side and demand-side methods of markup estimation
markup as follows:
µit ≡ Pit
MCit
= (
∂QitXit
∂XitQit
)/(
PXit Xit
PitQit
) = (
∂QitXit
∂XitQit
)/(
PXit Xit
Rit
) =
θXit
αXit
. (2.1)
where θXit denotes the output elasticity on input X, α
X
it denotes the share of expenditures on input
X, and P , Q, R denote product price, quantity, and sales revenue, respectively. To be specific,
the DLW method estimates markups as follows:
1. Estimate θXit and random disturbance term using ACF method
2;
2. Correct αXit using the random disturbance term obtained in the step 1;
3. Calculate markups (µit) using equation (2.1) and steps 1-2.
2If the input-output data are observable, some other parametric or nonparametric methods in addition to the ACF
method are also feasible in the first step.
3
3 PROBLEMS OF DLW METHOD
According to the three steps of DLW method, in order to estimate markups, researchers must first
estimate the output elasticity (θXit ) and expenditure share (α
X
it ). It is relatively easy to obtain
the data on αXit , but very difficult to estimate θ
X
it . Even DLW used the famous ACF (Ackerberg,
Caves, and Frazer, 2015) method to estimate θXit , there are still at least two serious problems.
3 .1 Disadvantages of Supply-Side Model
As summarized in Table 1, DLW method belongs to a typical supply-side method. Table 1 men-
tioned four disadvantages of supply-side methods: First, this kind of model assumes that at least
one input factor is free to adjust; second, assumes cost-minimizing producer, so factor price is
equal to its value of marginal product (PX = ∂R/∂X); third, assumes a special production-
function form, for example, translog form, so there may be specification bias3; fourth, estimating
the output elasticity of a given factor should control the inputs of other factors, productivity level
and the random disturbance term, but productivity and random disturbance term are unobserv-
able, and productivity is endogenous.
If employ ACF method to estimate production function and θXit , the latter two disadvantages
could be solved partially, but it is still hard to avoid the first two disadvantages. Inputs, in fact,
are difficult to freely adjust, especially DLW chose labour factor, which has adjustment costs
obviously.4 Additionally, factors markets are not necessarily in equilibrium level, so producers
maybe do not realize cost optimization, leading the FOC of cost minimization does not satisfy.
3If employ a translog or high-degree polynomial production function, the estimate of marginal output (and output
elasticity) of a certain factor may be negative, which is caused by the inherent defects of parametric methods. When
the estimate of output elasticity (θ) is negative, the DLW method loses efficacy.
4DLW gave some discussions about adjustment costs, but did not solve the problem. In other words, DLW assumed
free of any adjustment costs when derived the FOC, but this assumption is very strict.
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3 .2 Unobtainable Production Data
According to equation (2.1), DLW gave the estimation formula of markup as µit = θ
X
it (α
X
it )
−1,
where θX denotes output elasticity of factor X, i.e., θX = ∂lnQ/∂lnX (for simplicity in notation,
the subscripts are omitted; the same below). However, in reality, researchers often cannot obtain
the specific data of output (Q), even for producers themselves, because a firm could produce
a variety of products. Generally, researchers can only obtain the data of operating income (or
added value), i.e., R = PQ. Therefore, most researchers use R instead of Q to estimate output
elasticity.5
After using R instead of Q, the markup estimated by DLW method is µˆ = (∂lnR/∂lnX)/αX ,
where ∂lnR/∂lnX satisfies
∂R
∂X
X
R
=
∂P
∂X
X
P
+
∂Q
∂X
X
Q
=
∂P
∂Q
Q
P
∂Q
∂X
X
Q
+
∂Q
∂X
X
Q
= (1 +
1
η
)
∂lnQ
∂lnX
. (3.1)
where η denotes price elasticity of demand, ∂lnQ/∂lnX = θX is the real output elasticity on
input X; because Q is unobservable, it is also difficult to estimate the real θX . According to the
relationship between markup and market power, µ = 1/(1 − υ), where υ denotes Lerner Index.
And through MR = MC,6 there exists υ = −1/η. Therefore, µ = η/(1 + η), which is equivalent
to 1/µ = 1 + 1/η. Substituting it into equation (3.1), obtain
∂R
∂X
X
R
=
1
µ
∂Q
∂X
X
Q
. (3.2)
By equation (3.2), using (∂lnR/∂lnX)/αX to estimate markup in the DLW method is equiva-
lent to µˆ = (∂lnQ/∂lnX)/(αXµ), and because the real markup satisfies that µ = (∂lnQ/∂lnX)/αX ,
5DLW wrote that“The estimation of the production function requires information on plant-level output (revenues
deflated with detailed producer price indices), (deflated) value added, input use: labor as measured by full time equivalent
production workers, raw materials and a measure of the capital stock.” Thus they used revenues instead of outputs, but
revenues have included price information while output only represents quantity.
6No matter in a perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, or monopoly market, rational producers
always make decisions based on this principle, so MR = MC is not very strict. If we do not impose this condition, it is
almost impossible to analyze the supply-side model or demand-side model.
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have µˆ ≡ 1 theoretically. From the above derivation, if researchers use operating revenue or added
value or similar income indices instead of output quantity to estimate markup, the theoretical
estimate of markup should equal to 1. If the actual estimate results are not equal to 1 (such
as DLW’s results), the main reason is that the premise of cost minimization is not satisfied, i.e.,
∂lnR/∂lnX 6= αX . Therefore, no matter the estimated markups of DLW method equal to 1 or
not, the results do not reflect the real markups.
According to equation (3.2), the real markup satisfies7
µ =
∂Q
∂X
X
Q
/
∂R
∂X
X
R
. (3.3)
But, estimated markup of DLW method is
µˆ =
∂R
∂X
X
R
/αX . (3.4)
If actual data satisfies the assumption of DLW method, i.e., cost-minimizing producers, the
equation, ∂lnR/∂lnX = αX , holds. At this case, from equation (3.4) there exists µˆ = 1, which
is a paradox8. As mentioned above, inputs are difficult to freely adjust, and producers are also
hard to make decisions in strict accordance with cost minimization, so in fact factor price is often
lower than its value of marginal product, i.e., ∂R/∂X ≥ PX , so ∂lnR/∂lnX ≥ αX . On the
other hand, because the markup of ordinary goods tends to be greater than 1, by equation (3.3)
we know ∂lnQ/∂lnX ≥ ∂lnR/∂lnX. Therefore, compare equation (3.4) to equation (3.3), both
numerator and denominator are smaller, so DLW overestimating or underestimating markup is
not sure, but obviously the estimation is not correct.
7From equation (3.3), if use operating income (R) instead of output quantity (Q) to estimate output elasticity of
factor (∂lnQ/∂lnX), it is equivalent to assume that markup = 1.
8According to the assumptions of DLW method, if firms are cost-minimizing producers, then ∂lnR/∂lnX = αX .
Substitute it into equation (3.3), we can obtain µ = (∂lnQ/∂lnX)/αX , which is the calculating formula of markup
given by DLW. However, because Q is unobservable, DLW and a lot of other papers that cited the DLW method used
∂lnR/∂lnX to replace ∂lnQ/∂lnX, then µˆ = (∂lnR/∂lnX)/αX = 1 because ∂lnR/∂lnX = αX . Therefore, DLW
method is a paradox, using an identical equation to estimate markup.
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